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Audit of technical barriers in the process facility on Goliat FPSO

During the period 22-23 September 2010, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) carried out an audit of Eni Norge AS’ (Eni’s) safeguarding of technical barriers tied to the design solutions for the process facility on Goliat FPSO.

The audit was carried out at Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) in London.

The audit activity was based on the PSA’s main priority regarding technical and operational safety. The audit was particularly focused on establishment and design of selected barriers and the connection to the regulations, standards, internal requirements and risk-related analyses and assessments. The chosen topics were: process safety, fire and explosion safety, depressurisation and flare, open drainage and ignition source control.

The purpose of the audit was to assess how Eni ensures comprehensive and consistent safeguarding of safety-critical barriers, as well as following up that the design solutions on Goliat FPSO meet the regulatory requirements and assumptions in the plan for development and operation.

The audit was limited to the technical areas of process safety and technical safety, and founded in the requirements for technical barriers in the Management Regulations and the Facilities Regulations.

Through the audit we were able to shed light on selected topics within process safety and technical safety. At that time, the project had substantial remaining work to be completed in the next weeks. Some work was also postponed until the next project phase.

Two nonconformities and seven improvement items were identified during the audit.


  • The regulatory requirements for two independent safety levels for protection of equipment in the process facility are not complied with for the overpressure protection on the inlet from subsea wells to the process facility.
  • The regulatory requirement for robust and the simplest possible solutions has not been complied with for the riser.

Improvement items:

  • The quantitative risk analysis (the QRA) presented to the PSA was prepared in the FEED (Front End Engineering and Design) phase, and it is a rough and general analysis. As the project now enters into a new phase with detailed engineering, the project will have a need for more precise and detailed analyses to determine design loads. The plan calls for a new revision of QRA from the consultant on 5 October 2010.
  • The identified design accident loads (DAL spec) were prepared in the FEED phase, and are lacking and unclear in several areas. The project needs a DAL spec as a basis for engineering in relation to defined accident loads. It is planned that a new revision of the DAL spec will be ready from the consultant on 5 October 2010.
  • Inadequate highlighting of the connection between the safety strategy and definition of main areas and main safety functions in QRA.
  • Analyses have not been carried out to ensure that the design of the gas emissions system is in accordance with the requirements.
  • Design choices in connection with cold climate have not been documented.
  • Some discrepancies were identified between Eni, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and CB&I’s design requirement documents in the project.
  • Systematic mapping of potential ignition sources (electrical and non-electrical), including risk assessments and protection measures, has not been carried out.

The audit was well-organised by Eni. The topics were illuminated in a good and informative manner.