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Audit of crane operations on Statfjord C

During the period 24 - 28 May 2004 the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) conducted an audit of crane and lifting operations on Statfjord C (SFC). We carried out a verification of technical condition and status of lifting appliances and lifting gear on the installation. We observed lifting operations, both with the use of offshore cranes and with rigging and use of lifting equipment in connection with mechanical maintenance work in the process area. The PSA sent the audit report to Statoil ASA on 9 July 2004. In the covering letter we have given the company a notification of order.


Background for the audit

The background for the audit is that incidents related to crane and lifting operations account for a substantial part of the total number of incidents and accidents in the activities on the shelf.

This activity is an audit to follow up the report on causes of incidents and accidents using offshore cranes, and focuses on the most pronounced causal elements.

Lifting operations were also mentioned in the letter of award from the Ministry for 2003 and in Storting (Norwegian Parliament) White Paper No. 7 on health, safety and the environment in the petroleum activities.

Prior to the audit the PSA received documents from Statoil that were purportedly governing documents for activities related to crane and lifting operations on SFC.

Purpose of the audit

The goal of the audit was to verify that Statoil complies with requirements laid down in regulations, standards and internal governing documents on SFC.

Result of the audit

During the kick-off meeting at Forus some unclear items/uncertainty emerged related to Statoil's descriptions of responsibilities. This concerned the establishment and implementation of area responsibility, operational system responsibility, technical system responsibility, technical discipline responsibility, responsible person and responsible owner.

What Statoil presented as governing documentation for the audit area was partially or completely unknown on board SFC, and consequently not implemented.

Statoil's work process requirements laid down in WR 0307 were unknown to most of the persons interviewed.

The interviewed persons' knowledge and understanding of the document's contents and specifications of responsibility for equipment were not in conformity with the document's descriptions.

Central management positions with responsibility for following up crane and lifting operations were not familiar with the PSA's regulations and Norsok R003N.

Contact person in the PSA:
Mike Theiss