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Audit of emergency preparedness on Statfjord A

Audit: During the period 6 - 8 May 2009, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) conducted an audit of StatoilHydro on the Statfjord A facility. The audit was aimed at the technical discipline emergency preparedness to verify whether the preparedness tasks are safeguarded in compliance with the regulatory requirements. We identified two nonconformities and five potential improvement items.


The audit was carried out by reviewing documents, conducting interviews, conversations and verifications.

Statfjord A (source: Scanpix)

Statfjord A (source: Scanpix)

Background for the audit
The basis for the audit was, inter alia, Chap. III-IV of the Facilities Regulations relating to emergency preparedness, Chap. VI-II of the Activities Regulations relating to competence and Chap. XI relating to emergency preparedness.

The PSA shall contribute to technical and operational robustness, and evaluate the company's competence and capacity in relation to a new organisational model.

Purpose of the audit
The purpose of the audit was to verify that StatoilHydro safeguards preparedness-related factors on Statfjord A in accordance with regulatory requirements and the company's own governing documents.

This includes organisation of the emergency preparedness including cooperation on preparedness, maintenance of emergency response equipment, means of evacuation and escape routes, maintenance of personnel competence related to emergency response functions, emergency response drills and exercises and ICT safety.

Result of the audit
We identified two items that we classify as nonconformities in relation to the regulatory requirements.

The main impression from the audit on Statfjord A is, however, that emergency preparedness is properly safeguarded even if there is room for improvements in connection with some technical and operational aspects.

Identified non-conformities:

  • Deficient safety signposting and labelling in the outdoor area
  • Blocked escape route to lifeboat.

Potential improvements:

  • Deficient training/drills in connection with the substitute role
  • Deficient knowledge of administrative ICT safety guidelines
  • Deficient maintenance of ROC certificates
  • Deficient emergency preparedness competence
  • Deficient training in connection with redundant MOB system