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Audit of maintenance management on Alvheim and Mærsk Inspirer

The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) carried out verifications on Alvheim in Haugesund on 1 October 2007 and on Mærsk Inspirer at the Volve field on 3-4 October 2007. Following the audit we believe that some work still remains before the systems are in compliance with the regulatory requirements for maintenance management. Non-conformities and areas with potential for improvement were found.


In addition, a meeting was held to present the maintenance management system, SAP, in Maersk Contractors Norge AS' (MCN) premises at Forus. The audit activities were related to maintenance management and were carried in the form of document reviews, conversations and verifications.

Background for the audit
Mærsk Inspirer is an FPDSO* which will operate on the Volve field for StatoilHydro and Alvheim is an FPSO** which will work for Marathon. MCN has for applied for an (AoC) for both facilities.

*FPDSO
Abbreviation for Floating Production, Drilling, Storage and Offloading. Mobile production and drilling facility.
*FPSO
Abbreviation for Floating Production, Storage and Offloading. Mobile production facility.


Mærsk Inspirer & Alvheim

Mærsk Inspirer and Alvheim (source: MCN and Aibel)

Mærsk Inspirer & Alvheim

Mærsk Inspirer and Alvheim (source: MCN and Aibel)

Purpose of the audit
The purpose the audit was to verify that issues related to maintenance management complied with regulatory requirements. The verifications were carried out on the basis of the AoC applications, as well as information received during the verifications on board the facilities.

Result of the audit
Some work still remains before the systems are in compliance with the regulatory requirements for maintenance management. Non-conformities and areas with potential for improvement were found.

Three-four different tagging systems were identified on Alvheim. In addition, some work remained before all the equipment on board was tagged. There was also some difficulty during the audit in producing real lists showing the back log on safety-critical equipment.

It was discovered that the management of third party equipment on Mærsk Inspirer was deficient. The maintenance system contained maintenance activities on third party equipment which was not on board, monthly maintenance programs were not relevant for some types of equipment, but were still signed out as completed.

No acceptance criteria or requirements for testing of emergency shut-down valves (ESDV) had been set in the maintenance system. Nor could it be documented whether assessments had been carried out which gave satisfactory results for two potential leakage sources on the gas riser before the ESDVs.

Contact person in the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway:
Mike Theiss