The audit was conducted in the form of a full-day start-up meeting with the land organisation on 1 September 2008, as well as a meeting with the land organisation at Sandsli with a review of the competence management and risk understanding systems.
The offshore verification took place at the Oseberg Field Centre (pictured) on 24-26 November 2008. Conversations were conducted with relevant personnel in connection with the audit activity, both the head of Oseberg operations and offshore personnel.
The following areas were emphasised in the audit:
The offshore verification at Oseberg was limited to competence management and understanding risk.
Background for the audit
In their investigations, the PSA and StatoilHydro have found that deficient understanding of risk and barriers is one of the most frequent underlying causes of serious incidents.
Professional competence and good knowledge of systems and equipment is a precondition for prudent management and execution of operations, maintenance and modification activities.
To ensure the best possible handling of abnormal and undesirable situations, it is important to have an understanding of the risk associated with implementing the activities.
Purpose of the audit
The purpose of the audit was to evaluate StatoilHydro's systems for ensuring competence and understanding of risk on the part of supervisory and operations personnel. This includes mapping of competence needs and communicating risk factors to relevant personnel on board.
The audit was intended to obtain more information about the following issues:
Result of the audit
The verification was carried out as planned with conversations and verifications on board, as well as a review of three different cases that were distributed to three groups of employees at the Oseberg Field Centre prior to the audit. The cases were related to three different undesirable incidents which the groups were asked to review and relate to their own work tasks. The reviews made by the groups formed the basis for the discussions with the PSA during the offshore verification.
We identified three nonconformities and several factors with potential for improvement. The nonconformities are linked to regulatory requirements for