The audit was conducted as a system audit with interviews of centrally placed persons from UPN and Troll-Sleipner.
Troll A and Sleipner (Source: Statoil)
Background for the audit
Technical condition is one the areas given priority by the PSA in 2006, and the audit activity is one of several activities directed at technical condition in Statoil. The audit activity is also carried out as a result of several serious incidents in the company in recent years.
Purpose of the audit
The purpose of the audit was to ensure that Statoil has established the necessary systems which identify the status of and ensure the "continuous" monitoring of technical condition. Furthermore, that non-conformities can be identified and corrected and that measures are implemented and have the desired effect through the established systems.
During the audit, special attention was given to what degree Statoil had established the necessary governing documents and that these were known and adhered to in the organisation. The 2005 Technical Condition Safety (TCS) review for Kvitebjørn was reviewed to verify compliance with internal requirements.
Result of the audit
The audit was carried out according to plan and was well facilitated by Statoil.
The main impression following the audit is good.
The company had established the necessary work processes and governing documents to ensure compliance with requirements for management of its operations, maintenance and modification activities.
Good technical condition was ensured, inter alia, by:
The establishment of a separate unit for follow-up of operations, maintenance and modifications in Troll-Sleipner (DVM).
The established tool for follow-up of technical condition in Statoil (TCS) provides an opportunity to uncover important safety-related conditions at the facilities.
During the audit, we have found non-conformities and potential for improvement as regards the company's internal requirements and the PSA's regulations in some areas, such as governing documents, handling of non-conformities, following up findings in TCS reports and training/competence.
For practical and resource-related reasons, we in the PSA chose to focus on Troll-Sleipner in order to verify how systems and governing documentation was complied with. Based on this limited material, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as regards to what degree all our observations (e.g. for TCS) are representative for all units in Statoil UPN.
Contact in the PSA: