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Audit of technical safety and emergency preparedness on Troll C

During the period 14-16 March 2005, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) conducted a verification activity on board the Troll C facility. The audit activity was aimed at management systems, technical safety and emergency preparedness. The activity on board was carried out by means of document reviews, interviews, conversations and verifications.


Troll CAn emergency response exercise, which included the entire emergency response organization on board the Troll C, was carried out during the audit.

The audit was mainly based on the Regulations relating to conduct of activities in the petroleum activities (the Activities Regulations), Chapter VI-II Competence and Chapter XI Emergency preparedness.

Emphasis was also placed on regulatory requirements linked to technical safety, ref. Activities Regulations, Chapter VI-IV Prerequisites for use with appurtenant provisions.

Background for the audit

The PSA is to set the standards for and follow up to ensure that the players in the petroleum activities maintain a high standard of health, environment, safety and emergency preparedness, and through this help create the greatest possible values for the society.

We placed emphasis on the fact that a relatively long period of time had passed since the last audit focusing on technical safety and emergency preparedness on board Troll C.

Purpose of the audit

The purpose of this audit activity was to verify that the management, operational, technical and organizational factors within the fields of technical safety and emergency preparedness on Troll C are in accordance with regulatory requirements.

Result of the audit

We identified one non-conformity in relation to the regulatory requirements.

In addition, it emerged during the audit that there is room for improvement of several technical and emergency preparedness-related factors on board Troll C.

The result for the factors related to technical safety are largely improvement points in the maintenance system, as well as procedures and interval for testing the firewater system. Tests were conducted without adverse remarks.

With regard to emergency preparedness, this relates to non-conformities linked to the fact that the main cranes used to lift personnel in the MOB boat do not have a double brake system.

In addition, there was a potential for improvement as regards response time for the available MOB boat systems, knowledge of the emergency plan among personnel in the emergency response organization, and the fact that survival suits at the lifeboat stations were only provided in size "large".

Moreover, somewhat worn yellow paint was observed in the escape routes in the outdoor area, as well as inconsistent use of yellow paint in stairs classified as escape routes.

Contact person i the Petroleum Safety Authority
Mike Theiss