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Audit of Teekay Petrojarl Production AS

During the period 23-24 October and 29-31 October 2007, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) conducted an audit of Teekay Petrojarl Production AS (Teekay) and the company's activity on board the production facility Petrojarl I. The audit targeted the company's HSE management system and factors related to working environment, crane and lifting operations, electrical, process and safety systems.


The audit was implemented by means of document reviews, conversations and verifications at the company's office in Trondheim, as well as verifications on the facility.

Background for the audit
Teekay owns and operates two mobile production facilities (FPSOs), Petrojarl I and Petrojarl Varg, which are active on the Norwegian shelf. Petrojarl I carries out activities for Statoil on the Glitne field, and Petrojarl Varg carries out activities for Talisman on the Varg field.

Petrojarl 1 & Petrojarl Varg

Both of the facilities are registered in a national ship's register. Teekay has applied for (AoCs) for the facilities. The audit is part of the PSA's processing of these applications.

Purpose of the audit
The purpose of the audit was to verify that factors related to the company's HSE management system and that technical and operational conditions on the Petrojarl I, within the technical disciplines covered by this activity, meet the regulatory requirements.

Result of the audit
Parts of the company's HSE management system were reviewed during presentations at the company's office in Trondheim. Some aspects were followed up by verifications on Petrojarl I.

The company's system for handling nonconformities does not function in accordance with regulatory requirements. Furthermore, potential for improvement was identified within the areas of competence and training, knowledge of the Shelf regulations and the AoC regime.

Within the area of cranes and lifting, we identified several areas that must be improved in order to achieve a level that complies with regulatory requirements. This relates particularly to controlling documentation for operation and use of cranes and lifting equipment, which has a number of deficiencies. The same applies to follow-up of identified deviations from GAP analyses* and measures described in inspection reports.

*GAP analysis
A GAP analysis examines the deviation (the gap) between the current situation and the desired situation.

The impression is nevertheless that the established practices on board are better than the guidelines and the requirements in controlling documentation.

As regards electrical, process and safety systems, Teekay has not implemented a complete conformity review. This could result in the identification of additional nonconformities in relation to the regulations, in spite of the fact that the technical condition of the facility is good.

The conformity review implemented for the working environment area is deficient; it is primarily a measurement against the company's management system and does not really address the status in relation to compliance with technical working environment requirements and exposure requirements.

Contact person in the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway:
Mike Theiss