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Audit of working environment, emergency preparedness, electrical, production and technical safety on Mærsk Inspirer

During the period 20-23 March 2007, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) conducted verification activities on board the Mærsk Inspirer, which was moored at a shipyard in Haugesund for rebuilding into a combined drilling and production facility. The activities were aimed at factors related to working environment, emergency preparedness, electrical, production and technical safety.


The activities were carried out by means of document review, conversations and verifications on board the facility, and constituted part of the PSA's processing of an application from Mærsk Contractors Norge AS (MCN) for an expanded AoC (link).

Mærsk Inspirer (kilde: Maersk)Background for the audit

The Mærsk Inspirer was originally built as a jack-up drilling facility. An AoC as a drilling facility was granted on 10 October 2005. The facility is now headed out to the Volve field for Statoil as a combined drilling and production facility. Therefore, an expanded AoC which also covers petroleum production is required.

Purpose of the audit

The purpose of the audit was to verify that aspects related to working environment, emergency preparedness, electrical, production and technical safety were in compliance with regulatory requirements. The verification was performed on the basis of the AoC application and other relevant information received from Mærsk Contractors Norge AS (MCN).

Result of the audit

Working environment
Comprehensive and systematic design and fabrication work has been implemented in the various phases of the project. A number of working environment studies, design reviews, follow-up of selected equipment deliveries and verifications have been performed to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements regarding working environment.

Based on a quick verification (inspection) of parts of the Volve process module, we obtained a good overall impression of the project's work to ensure good future working environment conditions.

Because of the project's degree of completion, the PSA could not verify working environment factors in parts of the wellhead module, as well as factors linked to signposting, systems for control and handling of chemical products, lighting and noise conditions. However, the PSA has been assured that these are factors which the project will follow up at a later point in time when conditions allow for this.

Emergency preparedness
There was a great deal of scaffolding on board, which blocked access to escape routes. Some of the areas on board were not accessible for inspection because of the ongoing work. This made it difficult to obtain a practical overview of the escape route philosophy. It was also difficult to consider the adequacy or suitability of the escape routes.

Electrical, production and technical safety
Only the new part of the facility was verified. The new modules were of consistently good quality. A few nonconformities and improvement items were discovered, but none of these were of a particularly serious nature.

Posting of signs and general labeling was deficient, but MCN stated that this would be in order before production start-up.

Link:

Contact person in the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway:
">Mike Theiss