The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) staged the 2018 Arctic Safety conference in Stavanger on 21-22 March.
We have carried out an audit of the assembly of the drilling facility for the Johan Sverdrup field.
We have carried out an audit of Statoil's follow-up of technical, operational and organisational barrier elements.
We have carried out an audit of Statoil, focused on materials handling, safe use, maintenance and procurement of lifting equipment and work at height at Åsgard A.
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has issued an order to Transocean Offshore Ltd (Transocean) following an audit of the management of emergency preparedness and logistics on Transocean Spitsbergen.
We have carried out an audit of Statoil Mongstad and the company's follow-up of the H2 gas leak in October 2016.
We have carried out an audit of Statoil's planning of production drilling for Johan Castberg.
We have carried out an audit of Statoil focused on the follow-up of measures within materials handling, cranes, lifting and the working environment at the Sture terminal.
We have given Statoil consent to use the Aasta Hansteen spar FPSO, subsea systems and infield pipelines on the Aasta Hansteen field in the Norwegian Sea.
Spirit Energy has received consent to use Maersk Interceptor on the Oda field.
The activities at the land facilities are in some aspects significantly different from the activities on the shelf. This is especially true for development phases for new facilities which include disciplines within traditional construction activities, such as demolition and blasting, transporting mass, quay facilities, construction cranes and other construction machinery and equipment. In addition, there is of course the fact that the land facilities, due to their geographical location, may have closer ties to local communities.
New developments or major modification work at the land facilities are, like the development projects on the shelf, characterised by short time horizons and tight budgets, which entails many parallel activities at the construction sites with many different players involved. This necessitates unified management of the activities.
For most land facilities, the integration between shelf and land means that they are directly connected to the activities which take place on the fields they are linked to in that they process gas and/or condensate from these fields in the same way that gas and condensate are processed at offshore facilities. There is thus an inter-dependence between the activities at the individual land facility and the associated fields.
Management-wise, there is a clear inter-dependency which can entail that if a serious incident takes place at a land facility, it may have major consequences for the activities on the field and the installation connected to the land facility and vice versa. A shutdown at the land facility may thus result in shutdown of production at a connected facility. It is also possible to control parts of the activities on facilities from control rooms at the land facility.
Based on the need for unified risk management and full safeguarding of HSE, it is therefore a precondition that the activities on the shelf and at the land facilities are seen as a whole and governed using the same principles.
Risk contribution to major accidents
The largest risk contributors to major accidents at the land facilities in the operating phase are hydrocarbon leaks with subsequent fire and explosion.
At some land facilities, the processes are more complex than on facilities on the shelf, and the operating philosophy may differ drastically.
Trends in risk level (RNNP)
"Trends in risk levels" aims to measure and improve health, safety and environment conditions in the petroleum activities offshore and at the petroleum facilities on land. In 2006, land facilities which fall under our area of authority were included in this mapping.