The Norwegian model for managing safety in the petroleum sector may seem complicated. We have sought to produce an educational guide to the safety regime.
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway invites you to a conference on safety in the Arctic on 21 and 22 March in Stavanger.
In December 2017 we carried out an audit of wellhead fatigue at Statoil.
We have given Spirit Energy (formerly Centrica E&P Norge) consent to use the Island Innovator mobile drilling facility.
Lundin Norway AS is the operator for production licence 359 in the North Sea. We have given the company consent to drill exploration well 16/4-11.
Petroleum industry leaders were assembled for discussion when the PSA held its annual Top Executive Conference.
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has completed its investigation of a condensate leak on the Gjøa field on 21 June 2017. This identified breaches of the regulations, and notice of an order has been given to operator Engie E & P Norge AS (Engie).
We have given Eni Norge consent to use the Songa Enabler mobile drilling facility on the Goliat field.
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has issued an order to Maersk Drilling Norge (Maersk) following the investigation of the fatal accident of 7 December 2017.
The activities at the land facilities are in some aspects significantly different from the activities on the shelf. This is especially true for development phases for new facilities which include disciplines within traditional construction activities, such as demolition and blasting, transporting mass, quay facilities, construction cranes and other construction machinery and equipment. In addition, there is of course the fact that the land facilities, due to their geographical location, may have closer ties to local communities.
New developments or major modification work at the land facilities are, like the development projects on the shelf, characterised by short time horizons and tight budgets, which entails many parallel activities at the construction sites with many different players involved. This necessitates unified management of the activities.
For most land facilities, the integration between shelf and land means that they are directly connected to the activities which take place on the fields they are linked to in that they process gas and/or condensate from these fields in the same way that gas and condensate are processed at offshore facilities. There is thus an inter-dependence between the activities at the individual land facility and the associated fields.
Management-wise, there is a clear inter-dependency which can entail that if a serious incident takes place at a land facility, it may have major consequences for the activities on the field and the installation connected to the land facility and vice versa. A shutdown at the land facility may thus result in shutdown of production at a connected facility. It is also possible to control parts of the activities on facilities from control rooms at the land facility.
Based on the need for unified risk management and full safeguarding of HSE, it is therefore a precondition that the activities on the shelf and at the land facilities are seen as a whole and governed using the same principles.
Risk contribution to major accidents
The largest risk contributors to major accidents at the land facilities in the operating phase are hydrocarbon leaks with subsequent fire and explosion.
At some land facilities, the processes are more complex than on facilities on the shelf, and the operating philosophy may differ drastically.
Trends in risk level (RNNP)
"Trends in risk levels" aims to measure and improve health, safety and environment conditions in the petroleum activities offshore and at the petroleum facilities on land. In 2006, land facilities which fall under our area of authority were included in this mapping.